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counsel for a group challenging that 
statute as unconstitutional. 
Steven Davison, a third year law stu-
dent at Yale Law School, has partici-
pated in the litigation challenging the 
1967 Colorado Therapeutic Abortion 
Act. 
Since the authors of this article are 
men and since a central contention in 
the controversy over abortion is that 
the resolution of these issues remains 
in the control of men, the Review has 
invited four women involved in the 
abortion reform movement to partici-
pate in a symposium. In the fall issue, 
we will present a transcription of their 
discussion on this article and on 
abortion reform in general. 
The Editors 
Abortion Reform 
by Richard D. Lamm 
and Steven G. Davison 
All societies have faced the problem 
of unwanted pregnancy. A recipe for 
inducing an abortion has been attri-
buted to the Chinese Emperor Shen 
Nung, who reigned in the 27th 
century B.C. Egyptian papyri con-
taining information both on birth 
control and abortion have been found. 
Views on abortion, however, have 
varied both between cultures and with-
in the same culture. The Hippocratic 
oath, which states, "I will not give to a 
woman an abortive remedy," did not 
reflect contemporary Greek attitudes, 
but was derived from the views of 
Pythagoreans, a minority within the 
Greek culture. Plato suggested abor-
tion as a method for maintaining the 
stability of population in his ideal 
state, .and Aristotle felt that abortion 
"before she felt life" was the solution 
when a woman "had the prescribed 
number of children." 
Other writers saw that abortion 
involved something more than an un-
wanted pregnancy and recognized 
certain rights of the fetus, but these 
were not rights which overrode a 
woman's health. Sonarus (A. D. 
98-138), an early Greek expert on 
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obstetrics and a biographer of 
Hippocrates, wrote that "[t] he fruit 
of conception is not to be destroyed 
at will because of adultery or of care 
of beauty, but it is to be destroyed to 
avert danger appending to birth .... " 
A 5th century Latin grammarian 
analogized abortion to "removing dry 
twigs to save a living tree, or jettison-
ing cargo to save a storm threatened 
ship." 
Legislative Regulation of 
Abortion 
There was no common law crime of 
abortion. Blackstone's Commentaries 
states that "life begins in contempla-
tion of law as soon as the infant is able 
to stir in the mother's womb." The 
first statute prohibiting abortion 
before quickening was not passed in 
England until 1803. Connec ticu t 
passed an abortion statute in 1821, 
permitting abortion after quickening 
only when necessary to preserve the 
life of the woman. New York adopted 
a statute in 1828 prohibiting all abor-
tions except where necessary to pro-
tect the life of the woman. Until 
recently, restrictive statutes like these 
remained in force in most states. 
Early court decisions and other 
evidence indicate that the original 
policy consideration in adopting anti-
abortion legislation was concern for 
maternal health.· All internal surgery 
was highly dangerous at the time, since 
Joseph Lister's findings on antiseptic 
surgery were not printed until 1867, 
over 40 years after the first sta tes 
began passing anti-abortion statutes. 
Abortions, even in hospitals, were 
much more dangerous than bearing a 
child, and the law sought to compel a 
woman to bear a child rather than to 
risk the dangers of abortion. 
Today, however, modern medicine 
gives us different policy considera-
tions. According to figures of Dr. 
Christopher Tietze of the Population 
Council, it is six to ten times more 
dangerous in the United States to 
complete pregnancy than to have a 
hospital abortion? Hungary reports 
0.6 deaths per 100,000 hospital abor-
tions, and Czechoslovakia had 140,000 
abortions in 1964, with no deaths. By 
contrast, estimates of the number of 
deaths resulting from illegal abortion 
range from 1,000 a year upward. The 
Los Angeles County General Hospital 
reports an average of 10 cases a day, 
or 3,500 cases a year, of women suf-
fering from poorly performed illegal 
abortions. In New York City almost 
half of all deaths associated with child-
bearing are related to illegal abortion. 
There was nothing on the horizon 
in the 1960's, when abortion reform 
began in the United States, to show 
that the availability of legal hospital 
abortions was improving or that the 
health hazards posed by illegal abor-
were diminishing. Lader, in his book 
Abortion, states that the number of 
hospital abortions declined from 
30,000 to 8,000 between 1941 and 
1966. These figures are in sharp con-
trast to the estimated 1,000,000 
illegal abortions performed each year 
in the United States. Kinsey shows 
that one out of five pregnancies in the 
United States is terminated by illegal 
abQ!tinn 
Keform was spurred in the 1960 s 
by a shift in general public opinion 
toward acceptance of liberalized 
abortion statutes? The change was 
reflected in 1962 when the Model 
Penal Code proposed by the American 
Law Institute included a provision 
permitting abortion if three physicians 
certified that continuation of preg-
nancy was (A) likely to result in the 
death of the woman, the serious im-
pairment of her physical or mental 
health, or the birth of a child with 
grave and permanent physical deform-
ity or mental retardation; or (B) if the 
pregnancy was the result of rape 
(including statu tory rape) or incest. In 
1967, Colorado became the first state 
to adopt a statute patterned generally 
after the 1962 Model Penal Code. The 
reform in Colorado received national 
publicity and generated similar efforts 
in a number of other states. California, 
Delaware, Georgia, Maryland, New 
Mexico, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Oregon and Virginia followed 
Colorado and passed similar reform 
statutes based upon the Model Penal 
Code. 
Since 1967, the deb a te with respect 
to liberalized abortion has moved from 
reform to repeal. In many states, 
yesterday's controversies are today's 
settled policies. Governor Rockefeller 
of New York has announced he would 
veto any legislation that seeks to 
amend restrictively the 1970 New 
York repeal statute. Hawaii, Washing-
ton and Alaska have joined New York 
in passing laws which permit women 
to receive abortions without regard to 
indications. Even the usually conserva-
tive National Conference of Com-
missioners of Uniform State Laws has 
recently appointed a subcommittee on 
abortion, and the subcommittee's first 
draft is tantamount to a call for repeal. 
I n a number of states, however, the 
time for liberalized abortion has not 
arrived. Iowa has defeated a reform 
statute, Maryland has refused to adopt 
a repeal statute to replace its 1968 
reform statute and the Connecticut 
House of Representatives has over-
whelmingly defeated a proposal to 
liberalize the state's restrictive abor-
tion statute. 
The ultimate disposition of these 
restrictive statutes may come from liti-
gation establishing the constitutional 
right of women to seek abortions with-
out restriction by the state. Attempts 
to obtain legislative reform have been 
paralleled by litigation challenging the 
constitutionality of both restrictive 
and reform statutes. There have been 
numerous lower court decisions with 
respect to the constitutionality of 
state abortion statutes, and there are 
approximately 70 suits challenging 
state abortion statutes awaiting 
decision in state and federal courts. 
Judicial Reform 
People v. Belous4 is the pioneering 
decision in the continuing effort to 
overturn restrictive abortion legisla-
tion. In an ambiguous decision resting 
on several grounds, the court held that 
California's 1850 abortion statute, 
which prohibited abortion except to 
save the woman's life, was unconstitu-
tional because it was so uncertain of 
meaning as to violate due process and 
because it violated a woman's right to 
life and to choose whether to bear 
children. The court stated that the 
state could not forbid a woman to 
procure an abortion where death 
from childbirth, although not medi-
cally certain, would be substantially 
certain or more likely than not. 
Since Belous, courts have declared 
similar Michigan,S Texas,6 South 
Dakota,7 Illinois,s Wisconsin9 and 
Pennsylvania I 0 statutes unconstitu-
tional. Courts have also held that the 
California reform statute II and the 
Georgia reform statute l2 are un-
constitutional. 
The constitutional grounds upon 
which these courts struck down 
statutes include violation of a woman's 
right to privacy in matters of family, 
sex and marriage; violation of the right 
of women to choose whether to bear 
children; violation of the right of a 
woman to control her own body, and 
violation of the right of privacy in the 
physician-patient relationship. These 
courts have required that the state 
show a compelling state purpose J3 to 
justify limiting a woman's right to seek 
an abortion, and have rejected pre-
serving the life of the fetus, protecting 
the life and safety of the woman, and 
discouraging pre-marital sexual inter-
course as compelling purposes. 
Opposing these cases are decisions 
by three-judge federal district courts 
upholding the restrictive Louisiana 14 
and Ohio ls abortion statutes and the 
North Carolina reform statu te. 16 
These decisions have reflected the 
argument that abortion statutes in-
fringe the rights of women and have 
held that states can restrict the avail-
ability of abortion to protect the life 
of the fetus. In so doing, they have 
upheld the power of the state to limit 
the indications for which women may 
seek abortions. 
Suits challenging the constitution-
ality of abortion statu tes basically in-
volve a conflict between the "right" of 
a woman to seek an abortion withou t 
restrictions imposed by the state and 
the "right" of the fetus to be born. 
The Supreme Court will eventually 
have to decide whether a woman has a 
constitutional right to seek an abortion 
without state restrictions. If the Court 
holds that a woman has such a right, 
it still will have to decide whether 
there are compelling state purposes 
which justify limiting abortions to 
certain indications. Preserving of the 
life of the fetus probably will receive 
the most serious consideration as a 
compelling state interest. 
This article will consider whether a 
woman has a constitu tional right to 
seek an abortion without state inter-
ference, and whether, if such a right 
exists, there is a compelling state 
purpose justifying restrictions upon its 
exercise. I t also will examine issues 
concerning restrictions on who can 
perform abortions and where abor-
tions can be performed; requirements 
that a woman consult with others 
before being permitted to seek an 
abortion; requirement of the consent 
of the woman's husband or guardians 
to her abortion; and provision of 
abortions for the poor. 
The Right of Married Women to 
Seek Abortion 
In recognizing a right to privacy in 
matters of marital sex and family 
planning, the landmark case Griswold 
v. Connecticut l7 laid a firm basis for 
establishing the constitutional right of 
married women to seek abortions. 
Griswold overturned the conviction of 
a physician and the Executive Director 
of the Planned Parenthood League for 
aiding and counseling in the use of 
contraceptive devices. There were 
several opinions acknowledging this 
right to privacy, but there was some 
disagreement as to the source of the 
right. _ 
In the opinion of the Court, Justice 
Douglas indicated that it was a 
penumbral constitutional right eman-
ating from five amendments of the 
United States Constitution. He held 
that the statute had a "maximum 
destructive impact" upon the marital 
sexual relationship. But the only such 
impace that he specifically mentioned 
was the possibility that enforcement 
of the statute might include searches 
"of marital bedrooms for telltale signs 
of the use of contraceptives." 
Justice Goldberg, on the other 
hand, found this right to exist under 
the Ninth Amendment. According to 
him, the statute infringed the right of 
married persons to control the size of 
their family by "voluntary birth 
control" and could not be upheld on 
the grounds that it discouraged extra-
marital relationships, since the state 
could exercise its power to prohibit 
extra-marital sexual relationships, 
without infringing marital rights of 
privacy. In separate opinions, Justices 
White and Harlan each saw this right 
to privacy as part of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
Some approximation of the scope 
of the Griswold right can be reached 
by putting the opinions together and 
deciding what it does not include. For 
example, if the only infringement of 
the right was that enforcement of the 
statute might involve searches of the 
marital bedroom, the Court could have 
stated that the statute could not be 
enforced by such searches. It would 
have affirmed, however, since the 
conviction in Griswold did not result 
from such a search. 
If the right was solely to choose 
whether to bear children, the Court 
also could have affirmed, holding that 
a married couple had the right to 
engage in sexual intercourse when they 
desired to conceive a child but that no 
such right existed when they did not 
wan t a child. 
Finally, if the Court had believed 
that a married couple was constitu-
tionally protected in choosing to con-
trol the size of their family but not in 
choosing the method of doing so, it 
could have affirmed, stating that a 
married couple could practice ab-
stinence, coitus interruptus or the 
rhythm method, but that the state 
could prevent the use of contraceptives. 
Consequen tly, Griswold incl udes 
the right of a married couple to select 
the means to regulate the size of their 
family and to have intercourse to ex-
press their love and to achieve emo-
tional and psychological gratification. 
For purposes of invoking Griswold, 
there seems to be little difference 
between abortion and contraception 
as methods of birth control. Both are 
voluntary methods to preven t an un-
wanted birth. Contraception usually 
prevents an egg from being fertilized, 
while abortion destroys the fertilized 
egg. But the intrauterine device (IUD) 
and the so-called "morning after" pill 
are considered abortifacients because 
they seem to destroy the fertilized egg 
by preventing its implantation in the 
wall of the uterus. IS If there are 
reasons why these bio-medical dif-
ferences should have legal significance, 
however, they should be considered 
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against a standard which protects the 
right to select birth control methods. 
Restrictive abortion statutes in-
fringe the right of choice to the extent 
of driving a woman to use methods 
which may be harmful to her or which 
involve a substantial risk of unwanted 
pregnancy. The pill has numerous un-
pleasant side effects, including depres-
sion,19 excessive fluid retentionjon, 
and possibly the tendency to cause 
blood clotting. Moreover, no contra-
ceptive is 100% effective: the pill is 
approximately 99% effective, the IUD 
approximately 97%, the diaphragm 
approximately 95% and the condom 
approximately 85%. A failure rate in 
contraceptives as low as 1% would 
produce over 250,000 unwanted 
pregnancies each year in the United· 
States.20 Thus, contraception as a 
method of birth control is only a first 
line of defense. Abortion is a necessary 
method of voluntary birth control 
where contraception has failed or was 
not used. 
Using Griswold to establish the 
right to abortion may raise problems 
involving the husband's consent, for 
Griswold is premised on a right to 
marital privacy which includes both 
husband and wife. But a doctrine of 
consent would permit the state to 
intervene on a spouse's side in a private 
dispute about one of marriage's most 
intimate and important questions. 
Nothing in Griswold suggests that 
marital disagreements in such matters 
are less private than agreements. 
The Right of Unmarried Women 
to Seek Abortion 
As mentioned above, the Griswold 
right is limited to married couples. The 
cases21 relied upon by Justices Douglas 
and Goldberg were concerned primari-
ly with the rights of marriage and 
raising children as part of a marital 
relationship, and the implication is 
that only sexual relationships between 
husband and wife are of such a funda-
mental character as to be protected by 
the Constitution. Justice Goldberg's 
opinion adds dictum that the state has 
the power to prohibit adultery, hO,mo-
secuality and extramarital sexual 
relationships. 
Establishing a right to abortion that 
encompasses both married and un-
married women can proceed along one 
of two lines. The first involves recog-
nizing the unspoken Ninth Amend-
ment right to seek one's own physical 
and emotional welfare. The second 
picks up the Baird v. Eisenstadt22 
clue that regulating sexual conduct by 
forcing women to bear unwanted 
children constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment under the Eighth 
Amendment. 
The Ninth Amendment, in which 
three Justices found the Griswold right 
to marital privacy, guarantees that the 
enumeration of certain constitutional 
rights "shall not be construed to deny 
or disparage others retained by the 
people." It protects those rights "so 
basic and important that it would be 
inconceivable that they are not pro-
tected from unwarranted interference" 
or "that would be ... natural [sl ubject 
of constitutional protection.,,2 
The right to care for one's physical 
and mental health has been recognized 
as a right included within Ninth 
Amendment protection.24 When the 
state does intrude in health matters -
as with drug laws; vaccination require-
ments; proscriptions against self-
mutilation and the sale of liquor to 
minors; phYSician licensing require-
ments and even involuntary blood 
transfusions-it does so with an eye to 
the well-being of its citizens. Yet 
factual information tells us that re-
strictive abortion laws have the effect 
of creating health hazards. 
Today, abortion is safer for a 
woman than carrying pregnancy to 
term and bearing a child; a restrictive 
abortion statute may force a woman 
to take on an unwanted health risk. 
While most such statutes allow abor-
tions when the mother's life or health 
is in danger, they require a medical 
certain ty greater than that reflected in 
common statistics-otherwise, of 
course, the statutes would be inter-
preted as allowing an abortion to any 
woman who wanted one. Moreover, 
when abortions are unavailable or 
severely restricted, a woman is pres-
sured to use contraceptives which may 
pose a health risk to her. Finally, it is 
indisputable that a sizable number of 
women are driven each year to illegal 
abortion with all its attendant health 
hazards, despite the supposed deter-
rent effect of restrictive abortion 
statutes. Thus, no public health 
rationale supports nonrecognition of a 
woman's right to protect her physical 
and mental health by seeking abortion. 
Restrictive statutes also interfere 
with the closely related right to receive 
the full benefit of treatment from 
one's physician.25 Because many 
statutes narrowly limit the indications 
for abortion, a physician is not always 
able to prescribe an abortion when he 
feels it is beneficial. Often, he must 
watch helplessly while his patient risks 
her health and life at the hands of an 
unqualified abortionist. 
These restrictions on the doctor-
patient relationship are of the same 
class as those involved in United States 
v. Freund,26 where the court invali-
dated a Prohibition era statu te which 
restricted the amount of alcohol 
which a phYSician could prescribe. 
The court went on to state, 
"It is an extravagant and unreasonable 
attempt to subordinate the judgment 
of the attending physician to that of 
Congress, in respect to matters with 
which the former alone is competent 
to deal, and infringes upon the duty of 
the physician to prescribe in accord 
with his honest judgment, and upon 
the right of the patient to receive the 
benefit of the judgment, and upon the 
right of the patient to receive the 
benefit of the judgment of the physi-
cian of his choice." 
In United States v. One Package, 27 
Judge Augustus N. Hand considered a 
provision of the Comstock Act pro-
hibiting the mailing of any item for 
"the prevention of conception or for 
. causing abortion." He held that the 
provision could not be applied to a 
licensed physician acting within the 
accepted medical practices of the day 
and pointed out that it would be un-
reasonable to prevent the suppression 
of articles, "the use of which in many 
cases is advocated by such a weight of 
authority in the medical world.,,28 The 
same reasoning would limit the appli-
cation of restrictive abortion statutes 
to unlicensed abortionists or would 
invalidate a statute clearly intended to 
apply to doctors. 
A second approach toward securing 
protected access to abortions proceeds 
by way of the cruel and unusual 
punishment clause of the Eighth 
Amendment. It focuses upon the 
penalties of unwanted pregnancy and 
birth that restrictive statutes impose 
upon women when contraception fails 
or has not been used. In striking down 
an anti-contraceptive statute, Baird v. 
Eisenstadt 29 seems to have relied on 
these grounds; applying the court's 
reasoning to restrictive abortion 
statutes suggests they are likewise 
invalid. 
Baird overturned the .. conviction of 
a birth control advocate for violating a 
Massachusetts law which prohibited 
exhibiting, seIling, giving or lending 
birth control devices to unmarried 
persons. The statute had been 
amended by the Massachusetts legisla-
ture in an attempt to comply as nar-
rowly as possible with Griswold. The 
court held it to be in conflict with 
fundamental human rights- though it 
did not specify which ones-and out-
side the powers of the state. Although 
it found that the legislature could 
prohibit and punish premarital sex, 
the Baird court ruled that it could not 
do so by making a "personally and 
socially undesired pregnancy" and "a 
possible obligation of support" the 
penalties. Though not stated, the 
underlying constitutional theory seems 
to be that such penalties would be 
cruel and unusual within the meaning 
of the Eighth Amendment. 
A woman who is denied an abor-
tion is faced with an unwanted preg-
nancy and the threat of bearing an un-
wanted child, or in the alternative, a 
choice between an illegal abortion 
with its attendant hazards and a legal 
abortion in another jurisdiction with 
all its expenses and inconveniences. A 
woman in such a situation has "a fate 
of ever-increasing fear and distress.,,3o 
This argument is not met by saying, 
as did the court in Steinberg v. 
Brown. 31 that an unwanted pregnancy 
is not cruel if it can be avoided by 
abstinence and is not unusual if the 
country is full of them; this ignores 
the fact that an unwanted pregnancy 
is cruel and unusual as a punishment. 
Baird recognized that unwanted preg-
nancies and children are no longer 
acceptable penalties for conduct con-
sidered deviant by the legislature. This 
judgment incorporates an established 
notion. 
"The basic concept underlying the 
Eighth Amendment is nothing less 
than the dignity of man .... [T] he 
words of the Amendment are not 
precise, and their scope is not static. 
The Amendment must draw its 
meaning from the evolving standards 
of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society.,,32 
Status of The Fetus 
Once the constitutional right to 
abortions has been established, it can 
be infringed only if the state can show 
a compelling interest or purpose. Pro-
tecting the health and safety of the 
woman is not a compelling state 
purpose because an abortion is safer 
than continuance of pregnancy and 
birth. Preventing pre-marital inter-
course and furthering public morality 
have already been rejected as com-
pelling interests. Fetal rights remain as 
the most likely possibility to receive 
serious consideration. 
Proponents of abortion reform 
argue that statutes should continue to 
respect the creative process inherent in 
fetal life but not at the expense of 
forcing motherhood upon dissenting 
women. They are concerned with the 
effect an unwanted pregnancy has on 
the quality of the mother's and the 
child's lives. On the whole, they tend 
to stress the quality of life after birth 
rather than the mere existence of life, 
while their opponents argue for the 
"transcendence of any life, born or un-
born, over the health or happiness of 
f II 'f ,,33 an older or more power u I e. 
Courts which have upheld restric-
tive abortion statutes while overturn-
ing laws prohibiting the use of con-
traceptives have generally relied on the 
fact that abortion always involves 
destroying the fetus while contracep-
tion usually does not. Thus, the 
majority in Rosen v. Louisiana State 
Board of Medical Examiners 34 
justified different treatment on the 
ground that 
" ... the basic distinction be tween a 
decision whether to bear children and 
one which is made after conception is 
that the first contemplates the creation 
of a new human organism, but the 
latter contemplates the destruction of 
. I d t d ,,35 such an orgamsm a rea y crea e . 
The court characterized the basic 
question as whether the state could, 
under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
"assign to the human organism in its 
early prenatal development as embryo 
and fetus a right to be born unless the 
condition of pregnancy directly and 
proximately threatens the mother's 
life." It held that the legislature could 
and found the Louisiana statute 
reasonably directed toward that aim. 
TheRosen court refused to recog-
nize any constitutional right to abor-
tion and consequently did not decide 
whether protecting the fetus was a 
compelling state purpose that would 
justify overriding that right. Similar 
reasoning was used with the same 
results in Corkey v. Edwards36 and 
Steinberg v. Brown,37 although the 
Corkey court contradicted itself in 
simultaneously acknowledging that 
fundamental issues of privacy were at 
stake and refusing to apply the com-
pelling state purpose test. All three 
decisions can be criticized on the 
ground that by not recognizing the 
woman's right to abortion, they mis-
characterize the question of the state's 
power to regulate and thus skew the 
balance between maternal and fetal 
rights. 
In any case, the law's decision as to 
where life begins is somewhat arbitrary 
from both a religious and a scientific 
point of view. Some proponents of 
liberalized abortion argue that the 
exact nature of the fetus is a matter of 
spiritual supposition and that "life" is 
a continuum-there being life in the 
sperm and the ova even before fertili-
zation. According to them, calling the 
fetus an "unborn child" begs the ques-
tion, for one might as easily call each 
sperm an "unconceived child." 
Others dispute the significance of 
fertilization as a scientific matter. 
"When a fetus is destroyed, has 
something valuable been destroye'd? 
The fetus has the potentiality of be-
coming a human being. A human being 
is valuable. Therefore is not the fetus 
of equal value? This question must be 
answered. 
"It can be answered, but not 
briefly. What does the embryo receive 
from its parents that might be of 
value? There are only three possibili-
ties: substance, energy and informa-
tion. As for the substance, it is not 
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remarkable: merely the sort of thing 
one might find in any piece of meat, 
human or animal, and there is very 
little of it-only one and half micro-
grams, which is about a half of a 
billionth of an ounce. The energy con-
tent of this tiny amount of material is 
likewise negligible. As the zygote 
developes into an embryo, both its 
substance and energy content increase 
(at the expense of the mother); but 
this is not a very important matter-
even an adult from this standpoint is 
only a hundred and fifty pounds of 
meat. 
"Clearly, the humanly significant 
thing that is contributed to the zygote 
by the parents is the information that 
'tells' the fertilized egg how to devel-
op into a human called 'DNA.' 
... The DNA constitutes the informa-
tion needed to produce a valuable 
human being. The question is: is this 
information precious? I have argued 
elsewhere that it is not. ... 
"People who worry about the 
moral danger of abortion do so be-
cause they think of the fetus as a 
human being, hence equate feticide 
with murder. Whether the fetus is or 
is not a human being is a matter of 
definition, not fact, and we can define 
it any way we wish.,,38 
There is no consensus or majority 
viewpoint among public health pro-
fessionals as to when human life 
begins.39 But evenifthere were agree-
ment in scientific circles as to where 
the line should be ~rawn, courts' • 
inquiry would not be at an end. 
. A-s l\ldge ~assibry pointed out 
III his dissent In Rosen, the "meaning 
of the term 'human life' is a relative 
one which depends on the purpose for 
which the term is being defined."40 
Consequently, he continued, even if 
science recognized that the union of 
sperm and egg results in a "human 
being," that would not necessarily 
settle the right of a woman to seek an 
abortion. The courts must make their 
own assessment of the status of the 
fetus for purposes of balancing its 
rights against that of the expectant 
mother. And a survey of the relevant 
case law shows that so far, it has not 
been accorded any legal rights as fetus. 
Many pregnancies are interrupted 
naturally (spontaneously aborted, mis-
carried or stillborn);41 stillborn fetuses 
are viewed as dead human tissue and 
disposed of without legal interference. 
A fetus that has died in the early 
months of pregnancy is considered by 
no state or nation to be a dead person. 
A charge of homicide will lie against a 
person who performs an abortion only 
where it is proved that the fetus was 
alive outside the mother's womb after 
abortion;42 no state imposes penalties 
for illegal abortion greater than those 
exacted for most misdemeanors. In 
addition, the majority of cases deny 
damages against a physician for per-
formance of an illegal abortion where 
the patient consented.43 Finally, there 
is no case law whatsoever to show that 
zygotes, blastulas or embroyos are 
"persons" under the protection of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.44 
Under English common law, abor-
tion of an unquickened fetus was not 
a crime ,45 and this view was absorbed 
into American common law by the 
vast majority of the courts which con-
sidered the question. Moreover, the 
English common law considered abor-
tion to be murder only if the fetus was 
quickened, born alive, lived for a brief 
period and then died.46 Execution of 
a pregnant woman was delayed for her 
to give birth to a child only if the fetus 
had quickened.47 
Opponents of reform and repeal 
legislation rely upon other areas of the 
law where they claim the fetus has 
been accorded rights.48 Steinberg v. 
Brown49 argues that since the law 
accords property rights to the fetus at 
conception, the state should protect 
the life of the fetus from that moment. 
The fetus, however, must be born alive 
to take property; it has no fetal rights 
to property. 50 Similarly, if a fetus is 
not born alive it cannot transmit an 
inheritance by intestacy to others.5 I 
Civil cases involving claims for pre-
natal injuries are also irrelevant for 
determining the status and rights of 
the fetus with regard·to abortion. A 
child must be born alive in order to 
recover damages for prenatal injuries; 
the right of recovery is a right that 
attaches to the living child, not to the 
embryo or fetus. 52 The policy under-
lying this rule is that a child who is 
born and lives should be compensated 
for post-natal loss caused by a pre-
natal act. This policy says nothing 
about the rights of the fetus qua 
fetus. 53 Where damages are awarded 
for the death of a fetus as a result of 
pre-natal injury, the recovery is for the 
"distressing wrong in the loss of a 
child,,54 and not for any injuries 
suffered by the fetus. 
In short, examining cases cited by 
opponents of abortion reform shows 
that the rights claimed on behalf of 
the fetus are actually rights which can 
only be exercised by the child after 
birth, or rights of the potential 
mother or father. The law's appropri-
ate recognition that pre-birth events 
may affect the legal status and rights 
of a child when born alive does not 
establish a state interest in the fetus as 
such. Neither does it demonstrate a 
state interest in forcing the mother to 
gestate the fetus and produce a live 
child.55 
Moreover, attempts to protect the 
fetus through restrictive abortion 
statutes have largely failed. While' they 
may prevent the vacillating woman 
from seeking an abortion, countless 
women still seek illegal abortions, 
often under the most frightening con-
ditions, to avoid giving birth to an un-
wanted child. In balancing fetal and 
maternal interests, then, it should be 
kept in mind that the status of the 
fetus as "life" is largely a rna tter of 
religiOUS and scientific speculation, 
that public policy has never led the 
courts to accord the fetus rights as a 
fetus and that attempts to protect the 
fetus through restrictive abortion 
statutes have led a remarkable lack of 
success, only driving women to the 
hazards of illegal abortion. 
Who, Where and When 
According to Doe v. Bolton,56 the 
state can limit abortions only to the 
extent that health and safety require 
it. This involves regulating who can 
perform abortions and where, and 
ensuring the quality of the woman's 
decision to seek an abortion. Courts 
should continue to uphold this power, 
and legislatures should exercise it. 
As to the first two areas, the con-
servative and easy approach is to allow 
only physicians to perform them and 
only in fully equipped hospitals. But 
such an approach has several draw-
backs. First, it drives the cost of abor-
tions up and thus discriminates against 
the poor. The cost of an abortion in a 
clinic can be as low as $80, while the 
average cost of abortions is $300 to 
$575 in private New York hospitals 
and $160 to $270 in New York 
municipal hospitals.57 Statistics indi-
cate that there is now a wide disparity 
between availability of abortions for 
poor and wealthy women.58 Reform 
st~tut~s s~o~ld .be aimed at eliminating 
this dlscnmInatIon as much as possible. 
Second, allowing only doctors to 
perform abortions and only in hospi-
tals may place an excessive demand on 
already overburdened facilities. Al-
ready, many states are including 
residency requirements in their reform 
statutes in order to avoid becoming 
"abortion meccas" and further 
straining their hospitals. Such require-
ments have been held unconstitutional 
as infringing the right to travel. 59 The 
problem they seek to address can be 
eliminated by easing the limitations on 
who can perform abortions and where. 
More imaginative legislation would 
allow abortions to be performed by 
state-certified and trained para-
professionals under the supervision of 
a physician competent to handle 
emergencies. It would also permit 
abortions to be performed in doctor's 
offices or medical clinics which have 
emergency facUities for providing 
transfusions and anaesthesia or are in 
close proximity to hospitals with such 
facilities. Limiting the performance of 
abortions to hospitals accredited by 
the Joint Commission of Accreditation 
of Hospitals, as is done under several 
reform and repeal statutes, is grossly 
inefficient because many of the 
requirements for accreditation (e.g., 
dietary and radiology facilities and 
facilities for emergency care for mass 
casualties) are useless in ensuring safe 
abortions. 
State legislatures should be con-
cerned with making funds available to 
the poor to pay for abortions-either 
under Medicaid60 or other programs-
since even an $80 clinic abortion may 
be too expensive for many women. 
Requiring health and hospital insur-
ance policies to pay thl) cost of abor-
tions may also go part way in solving 
the problem. State legislatures should 
also pressure or require state and local 
hospitals to perform abortions and to 
perforr~ them humanely . Some hospi-
tals deliberately attempt to discourage 
abortions by placing women seeking 
them in the obstetrics ward while 
awaiting the operation, and following 
the operation, where they wake up 
surrounded by mothers and new 
babies. For a while, Bellevue Hospital 
in New York City conducted fetal 
heartbeat monitoring while women 
were undergoing abortion-placing 
electrocardiograms next to them so 
that they saw and heard the fetus 
die.61 Congress should consider re-
quiring hospitals receiving Federal 
funds under the Hill-Burton Act62 
hospital construction program to per-
form abortions and to perform them 
humanely. 
As to the third area of state regula-
tion-ensuring the quality of the 
woman's decision-Doe v. Bolton held 
that because the fetus has a "potential 
of independent human existence" a 
woman should give serious and c~reful 
consideration to all relevant factors in 
reaching her decision to have an abor-
tion. These factors include emotional 
economic, psychological, familial and' 
medical considerations, and the state 
may require her to consult with 
licensed ministers, secular guidance 
counselors or licensed physicians other 
than the physiCian who will perform 
the abortion. If a woman is required to 
hear the views of both proponents and 
opponents of abortion, the interests of 
the fetus will be preserved sufficiently 
and the applicant will retain her free-
dom of choice. The function of the 
consultants is to expose the woman to 
both sides of the issue-not to veto her 
decision. Thus, the use of such re-
quirements to restrict the indications 
for which abortion is made available 
would be unconstitutiona1.63 
The work of the courts and the 
legislative process is being accelerated 
by the growing feeling that America 
and the world are undergoing drastic 
changes in their attitudes toward re-
production. The policy reasons for 
making an unwilling woman bear an 
unwan1ed child are gone, and have 
been replaced with a widespread 
felling that unwanted children are 
community burdens. People are in-
creasingly demanding control over 
their own reproductive activities and 
are either going to change the laws in 
the legislature, or attack them through 
the courts, or ignore the laws as do the 
thousands of women who each year 
get illegal abortions. 
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